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A JOINT EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF THE DUTCH AUCTION, BOOK BUILDING 




Vinicio de Souza e Almeida* 







We examine the differences of three IPO pricing methods jointly: book 
building, employed worldwide, the Dutch clock auction, routinely cited as an 
alternative to book building, and the competitive IPO, a recent innovation, 
tested in a few offers in Europe. We employ experiments with South American 
subjects who are bank professionals or business students. The main result is the 
characterization of book building as a pricing method that mostly benefits the 
investor at the expense of the issuer and the selling shareholders. The 
competitive IPO, on the other hand, was the method that gave the best 
results for the issuer and selling shareholders, at the expense of investors. The 
competitive IPO, however, showed more dispersion of initial returns and 
evidence of the "bait-and-switch" strategy, which may be disguised in book 
building offers but is clearly exposed in the competitive IPO. Issuers could 
benefit from regulation or private contracting that favor the competitive IPO 
if its procedure discourages "baiting-and-switching". Moving towards the 
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1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
There is a growing interest in the experimental analysis of the pricing 
methods for initial public offerings of equity (IPOs). Biais et al. (2002), Trauten 
and Langer (2008), Zhang (2006, 2009) and Bonini and Voloshyna (2009) 
present theoretical and empirical experimental analyses about the usual 
methods and propose alternatives to mitigate the problems of book building, 
the most common method. We test three pricing methods jointly under the 
same simulated environment: book building, the Dutch clock auction, and 
the competitive IPO, a relatively new method. The competitive IPO is a two 
stage decision process that separates the decision to hire an advising bank to 
structure the offer from that of hiring another bank to sell the offer by means 
of a competitive bid. The competitive IPO aims to avoid the "bait-and-switch" 
problem in which an underwriter may pressure for a lower offer price after it is 
hired by the issuers. Bonini and Voloshyna (2009) perform a similar analysis but 
they compare the new Ausubel (2004) auction method to more conventional 
auctions and  book building to the competitive IPO method separately. We 
compare three methods jointly, employ the same environment to analyze all 
the three methods, employ more subjects per method and include bank 
professionals as subjects. Trauten and Langer (2008) and Zhang (2006, 2009) 
compare the fixed price method to an auction. 
Setting the price is one of the key issues in an IPO because there is no 
price history and often no clear price reference. The usual methods to set the 
price in many countries are the book building or an auction. Around the 
world, financial institutions, possibly investment banks, carry out the pricing 
process in a competitive underwriting market where each institution obviously 
keeps the information about the intensions of their customers private. Thus, it is 
very difficult to conduct natural experimental studies with real data, unless 
local laws mandate that some of this information is disclosed or non-
replicable case studies are carried out using private and non-identified data. 
With no access to the actual pricing data and process, the alternative 
is to simulate it. We investigate the implications of different IPO pricing 
methods by means of controlled experiments in a simulated stock-offering 
environment, taking a closer look at the return levels, dispersion and the 
unveiling of information. Smith (1976) stressed the robustness and the 
importance of experimental techniques for the understanding of economic 
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phenomena as well as a primary tool to test and explore empirical predictions 
to be verified in the real world. 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) proposed the environment of information 
generation that supports our experiments where investment banks collect 
information about the investment intentions of their clients, define the offering 
price based upon it, and allocate the available shares. The disclosure of 
information by informed investors reduces information asymmetry in this 
model. 
The different sources of revenue for investment banks lead to possible 
conflicts of interest (Michaely and Womack, 1999; Ljungqvist et al., 2006; 
Reuter, 2006). For example, the lead underwriter has incentives to raise the 
offer price because its fees are tied to the total offer amount. In contrast, the 
same underwriter allocates shares to its prime clients and may reduce the 
offer price for their benefit, increasing their chance of greater gains in the 
secondary market. 
The lead underwriter controls the entire allocation process in the book 
building. It receives the price and quantity bids, determines the price and 
discretionarily allocates the offer among investors. Cornelli and Goldreich 
(2001) examined stock offerings in twenty different countries and found 
evidence that the lead underwriter allocates more shares to investors whose 
bids contain more information (quantity, price, different levels of quantity and 
price). The pricing process should be better when investors provide more 
information. On the other hand, Jenkinson and Jones (2004) found no 
relationship between the amount of information in the bids, the number of 
shares allocated to the investor, and the first day returns using European IPO 
data. They also note that long-term investors get more of the new shares than 
the so-called flippers. 
Dimovski and Brooks (2004) doubt the importance of the pricing and 
trading role of underwriters because their evidence suggest that their 
participation does not contribute to price discovery in Australian IPOs 
between 1994 and 1999. IPOs with no participation of financial intermediaries 
exhibited lower first-day initial returns. Lowry and Schwert (2004) reach similar 
conclusions and suggest that financial intermediaries do not aggregate either 
public or private information to the offer price. 
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The next section reviews IPO pricing methods. Section 3 describes the 
experimental design and the procedures of each pricing mechanism used in 
this study. Section 4 contains a discussion of the results and section 5 
concludes. 
2 – PRICING METHODS 
Wilhelm (2005) maintains that keeping their reputation is one of the 
reasons that may prevent abuses by the underwriters conducting a book 
building in IPO valuations. Book building overcame technological problems 
by bringing investors together. However, the lead underwriter still exercises its 
discretion. Wilhelm (2005) supports book building and is skeptical of 
alternative methods because there are no strong precedents that justify its 
replacement. 
Benveniste and Wilhelm (1997), Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) and 
Sherman (2000, 2005) stress that a key feature of book building is the ability of 
underwriters to reward investors that reveal their opinion about the true value 
of the company. Investors that include more information in their bid, such as 
quantity and price, receive greater allocations (Jagannathan and Sherman, 
2005). There may be more information production and more rewards to 
institutional investors with book building. Cornelli and Goldreich (2003) and 
Ljungqvist (2007) sustain that book building is the best pricing method for IPOs 
because it is a more effective information discovery procedure. 
Benveniste and Busaba (1997) suggested that book building results in a 
better price discovery than fixed price offers, even though it may also be 
associated to greater price dispersion. Their findings are consistent with those 
of Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) in different regulatory environments. Busaba 
and Chang (2010), in contrast, do not support the superiority of book building 
over fixed pricing in regards to the trading of the new shares in the secondary 
market. Book building may significantly influence the behavior of the new 
stock prices in the secondary market and the compensation of lead 
underwriters (Bartling and Park, 2010). 
The disadvantages of book building led many authors to advocate its 
replacement by one of the existing kinds of auction (Spatt and Srivastava, 
1991; Degeorge et al., 2008; Lowry et al., 2010). The auction was supported by 
Derrien and Womack (2003) and Derrien (2005), who compared it to the fixed 
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price and book building offer-pricing procedures in France. Zhang (2009) 
sustains that the uniform price auction method is superior to the fixed price 
auction. There is also evidence that a clock auction is more efficient than a 
sealed bid auction (Sherstyuk, 2009). Wilson (1979) asserts that the auction of 
fractions of assets (stocks, for example) presents the problem of the potential 
collusion between investors and the consequent undervaluation of the asset, 
leading to higher initial returns. Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet (2002) found that 
pricing is better when the auction technique resembles the book building. 
The uniform price method is the most common in auctions of multiple 
items. Each buyer states the price they wish to pay for a certain quantity of 
the goods under auction. Once all the bids are placed, the auctioneer 
allocates to the higher bidder first, with any remaining goods going to the 
second highest bidder and so on until there are no goods. The uniform price 
paid by all bidders is the lowest winning bid. 
Ausubel (2004) proposed an alternative methodology for auctions that 
could be employed in stock offerings. The auctioneer announces a price and 
bidders indicate the quantities they are willing to buy at such price. The 
auctioneer then announces successively higher prices until the quantity of 
goods offered clears. Bonini and Voloshyna (2009) compared the Ausubel 
(2004) auction to conventional auctions and concluded that it conduced to 
less undervaluation than in the uniform clock auction. 
Wilhelm (2005), conversely, rejected many of the book building 
criticisms and listed a series of problems with the other pricing methods, 
considering, in particular, the technological possibilities for their 
implementation. Book building may not be the ideal pricing method but it 
solved the problem of aligning bids in various locations around the world and 
provided a channel for the flow of information among potential investors. 
Ljungqvist et al. (2003) assert that the benefits of book building are even 
more salient when it is carried out by US banks or when offers are sold to US 
investors. Jenkinson and Jones (2009b), however, conduct a survey of 
institutional investors regarding new stock offerings and doubt the ability to 
produce information of the method. Jagannathan and Sherman (2005, 2006) 
concede that auctions were abandoned in many markets, recognize the 
advantages of book building and discuss how to reduce some of its flaws, 
especially those relating to its lack of transparency. They note that the main 
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problem of the auction is that its sole criterion for allocation is the price. 
Trauten and Langer (2008) employ experiments and sustain that there is room 
for the underwriters discretionary power in the allocation of IPO shares. 
There is a growing interest in a new pricing method called competitive 
IPO that derives from book building. Its modifications reduce the problems 
stemming from potential conflicts of interest of the lead underwriters. The offer 
structuring and selling tasks are split between different banks in a competitive 
IPO. Jenkinson and Jones (2009a) describe this innovative process, which was 
used in a few offers in Belgium, France, Greece, and Britain. They argue that 
one of its key advantages is that it is not a major departure from book 
building. Book building is the dominant method around the world and the 
auction is the usual alternative method employed to reduce the discretionary 
power of banks. Yet, the adoption of auctions significantly changes the way 
offers are currently carried out. The competitive IPO retains many of the 
qualities of book building and promotes small changes to control potential 
conflicts of interest. 
The competitive IPO changes the incentive structure of underwriters. 
The first step is the selection of a bank to be the advisor to the issuer who will 
conduct its formal procedures. The advisory bank selects the bank that will 
coordinate the selling effort after the road show and prior to the pricing date. 
Banks that compete to sell the offer submit bids for the proposed preliminary 
price range of the offer as in the traditional book building. The difference is 
that the choice of the selling bank is made later in the process. Additionally, 
the compensation of the selling bank depends on the pricing of the offer, 
which may not be less than a value related to the preliminary range 
proposed. This procedure reduces the incentives that banks may have to 
bait-and-switch, competing for the mandate to sell by offering high price 
ranges and, after hired, setting lower prices to potentially benefit investors. In 
the traditional book building, the bank proposes a price to the issuer, but 
during the course of the offering, and on the pricing day, may reduce this 
value substantially. 
The issuer has the power to hire whichever bank they like with book 
building, however, once selected, the bank will have a great deal of 
influence over the offering, given the high costs the issuer would incur if they 
decide to replace the bank. In a competitive IPO, the issuer may establish 
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that there will be no fee if the price is set below a certain level or the fee may 
decrease proportionally to the price. 
The competitive IPO received attention because of its potentially better 
price discovery may reduce the losses of issuers and of selling shareholders. 
However, Sherman and Titman (2002) warn that greater offer price accuracy 
leads to greater initial returns due to the larger number of investors needed. 
The track record of the competitive IPO is fairly recent. The debate over 
which method is better to set prices in initial public offerings depends on what 
one considers to be good or bad. Greater underpricing is good to short term 
investors and bad to issuers and vice versa. 
3 – EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
Bonini and Voloshyna (2009), to the best of our knowledge, have been 
the only authors to employ experiments to analyze the competitive IPO so far. 
Besides the subjects, which are more numerous and include professionals, the 
main change we introduce relative to their work is the way we perform the 
comparisons of the pricing methods. They compared book building to the 
competitive IPO in a setting and the clock auction to the Ausubel auction in a 
different setting but did not perform a joint analysis of these methods.  
We compared the uniform clock auction or Dutch auction, recently 
used in the Google IPO, book building and the competitive IPO in the same 
environment and with parameters from a single structure, enabling us to 
compare them jointly. All the experiment sessions were designed and 
conducted with the Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments 
(Fischbacher, 2007). The experiment sessions that produced our data were 
preceded by a series of pilot tests and sessions. The beginning of each session 
was preceded by three rounds of trial IPOs that allowed the participants 
practice the rules of the experiment. Data from these trial rounds were 
excluded from the analysis. Each session was made up of twenty-four rounds. 
Each round represents an IPO. 
Participants in the experiment were selected from undergraduate 
students and graduate business students in a large public South American 
university whose full time MBA is ranked in the top one hundred in the world 
by The Financial Times newspaper and among employees of a large financial 
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conglomerate ranked among the top three in Latin America that also acts as 
an IPO underwriter. We believe that we need to disclose that subjects are 
from South America but we do not make any claims that South American 
subjects would perform differently or similarly to those elsewhere. All subjects 
had previous exposure to financial concepts. Each session included between 
nine and eleven participants. There was a total of nine sessions in the whole 
experiment, each comprising twenty-four rounds (IPOs) and thus we 
collected simulated data for 216 (nine times twenty-four) IPOs, seventy-two 
(three sessions) for each of the simulated pricing methods (Dutch auction, 
book building and competitive IPO). Each session lasted sixty to eighty 
minutes. Eighty-seven different subjects participated in the experiment and 
each one participated in only one session, no matter which pricing method 
was simulated. 
Table 1 provides some details about the subjects and their 
performance. Fifty-six percent of the participants were professionals and only 
sixteen percent were females. The experience of professionals in years was 
three times longer than those of students and they were ten years older than 
students on average. Eighty-four percent declared some previous exposure 
to the stock market. We tested if the performance of professionals and 
students were different for each pricing method and found no statistically 
significant results. These results are not reported in Table 1 but are available 
from the authors. 
 
Table 1  Subject Characteristics 
 
  Students Professionals All 
Quantity 38 49 87 
Average age in years 25.8 35.7 31.3 
Number of females 11 3 14 
Number of males 27 46 73 
Subjects with stock market 
experience  25 48 73 
Professional experience in years 3.1 10.7 7.3 
Initial return - auction -0.64% 1.00% 0.46% 
Initial return - book building 0.61% 2.77% 1.33% 
Initial return - competitive IPO -5.21% -6.41% -6.01% 
Overall initial return -1.61% -1.16% -1.41% 
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We follow the informational structure of Kagel and Levin (1986, 1999). 
Assume that shares have a true value V, which is the closing market price on 
the first trading day, a random variable drawn from a uniform distribution in 
the [10, 110] range before each round. Participants are not aware of the 
value of V. An adjustment factor a in [0.8, 1.2] is then picked randomly. The 
value mid = V × a is the reference to build the price range with upper limit 
within [0.95 × mid, 1.3 × mid] and lower limit within [0.70 × mid, 0.95 × mid], 
randomly drawn. The upper and lower limits are drawn from these ranges 
randomly. These ranges are used in the clock auction and in the book 
building sessions. Each participant i receives a private signal Si about the 
value V. The values of Si  for each participant are extracted independently 
from a uniform distribution defined in the [V-e, V+e] range. This signal 
represents the private valuation each investor receives about the investment 
decision from their advisor and simulates both pessimistic and optimistic 
outlooks about the issue. The parameter e replicates the inaccuracy of the 
assessment that each investor receives and is also drawn randomly. 
Participants know only their own signals. 
The experiment reflects two major characteristics of IPOs: high 
uncertainty and the establishment of a community of experienced investors. 
The group of investors (participants) in each session is the same, forming a 
community, as it happens in the actual frequent interactions between banks 
and institutional investors. These investors interact continuously with their banks 
through their orders. Participants are divided into groups of investors in the 
case of the competitive IPO because it is important to isolate the community 
of clients of the same bank in this procedure. We offer more details ahead. 
A portion of the participants in the experiment had little financial 
market expertise but all received a financial reward as an incentive. Each 
subject received at least $5, enough to recruit participants, and could earn, 
depending on their performance, as much as $25. We follow Smith (1976) on 
the importance of control in experiments through the setting of a 
compensation system for the participants. The actions of each subject in the 
experiment will hopefully be motivated by the prospect of actual monetary 
gain (Smith and Walker, 1993). Participants do not compete for points or just 
for being the "winners". Their individual performance is reflected in the amount 
of money each one receives at the end of each session. 
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We designed procedures to capture as much of the characteristics of 
each pricing method as possible without losing the parsimony that allowed 
their simulation in a controlled environment. Each participant received 500 
units of the experiment currency at the beginning of each session. Profits and 
losses were recorded for each session round. One stock offering traded in 
each round consisting of thirty identical items (shares). Participants received 
their individual private information about the offering price (Si), representing 
their particular advisory system, and the preliminary price range for the 
offering, representing the preliminary information gathered by banks in real 
world. The offer would be cancelled if there was no demand for all shares. 
The profit (or loss) recorded in each round is equal to the positive (negative) 
difference between the market price (V) and the price paid by the investor, 
multiplied by the amount he or she received in the allocation procedure. The 
total profit or loss at the end of a session is equal to the sum of the profit or loss 
in each one of its rounds. 
3.1. Dutch auction design 
Participants inform the quantity of shares they want to buy considering 
the prices that are suggested by the virtual auctioneer, which fall in time 
during the round in proportion to the actual price level V. This procedure is 
necessary to prevent small decreases in the price level, which could lead to 
very time consuming rounds. Thus, price variation is a percentage of V and 
not a currency unit value because V lies in the relatively wide [10, 110] range. 
The auction (round) ends when the sum of the quantities demanded at a 
given price is greater or equal the quantity offered. The allocation is then 
done (fractionally if necessary) among those participants who have made 
quantity bids at the state price before the interruption. This method is mostly 
mechanical and is the least problematic to simulate. 
3.2. Book building design 
Each investor may inform the quantity of shares she or he is willing to 
buy and the maximum unit price she or he is willing to pay for them in each 
offer (round). The book is built and the clearing price to all allocated investors 
is the lowest bid informed when at the time a bid clears the thirty stocks in the 
offer. The allocation is made among those that bid at or above the clearing 
price in proportion to the quantities they demanded as in step four below.  In 
book building, all investors belong to the same group, which means that all 
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investors are clients of one bank, unlike in the competitive IPO, described in 
the following item. The step by step book building procedure is: 
Step 1: V is drawn and investors have access to private value Si.  
Step 2: The preliminary price range is set around V.  
Step 3: Participants inform their demands, building the book.  
Step 4: The allocation is made when ∑ q ≥ Q at the lowest bid price 
made. Each allocated investor receives k × q shares, where k=Q/∑q, Q is the 
quantity offered and ∑q is the sum of individual demands. 
3.3. Competitive IPO design 
Price formation in the competitive IPO is similar to that in the book 
building. The difference is the insertion of a preliminary step before the 
submission and processing of bids. Investors are divided into groups of three 
participants each. Each group represents the set of customers of one bank. 
Groups are formed randomly at the beginning of the session and remain the 
same throughout the twenty-four rounds (IPOs) in the session. Participants do 
not know who their fellow group members are and cannot communicate 
among themselves, whether or not they belong to the same group. 
In the first stage, each participant receives the private signal Si and 
informs the unit price that she or he would pay for the offer. The mean bid 
price for the members of each group (clients of the same bank) is obtained. 
The group that submitted the highest average price will be benefited in the 
allocation of shares. This emulates the preference given to the clients of the 
bank that offered the higher preliminary price, representing greater 
information disclosure about the true value of the stock. The preliminary price 
range is obtained with the highest price average and disclosed to all 
participants. In the next stage, subjects bid following the same rules as in the 
book building. Besides the preliminary price range (the same to all) and the 
private signal about the price (one for each and the same as in the previous 
stage), subjects are informed if their bank was the winner, which may result in 
allocation preference. 
The allocation procedure is also somewhat different relative to that 
employed in the book building. Clients of the winning bank (the group with 
the higher average bid in the first stage) are given preference in the 
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allocation. Their portion is greater than that of the clients of the other banks 
(groups). Clients of the winning bank are not certain of receiving  allocations 
as well as clients of the other banks are not barred from allocations. The 
difference will reside only in the proportion of the allocation. The original 
allocations to the clients of the winning bank, if allocated, are multiplied by a 
factor f in the open (1, 2) range, while the clients of other banks, if allocated, 
will have their allocations reduced by a factor of 2-f. 
4 – RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Figure 1 depicts three scatter plots of the prices resulting from the offer 
according to each one of the three methods and of the true value (V) that 
corresponds to the market value of the stock at the end of the first trading 
day, randomly picked at the beginning of each session. A visual inspection of 
the charts in Figure 1 suggests that book building results higher initial returns 
(underpricing), while competitive IPO may even result in overpricing. 
Table 2 confirms this observation in its Panel A but Panel B shows that 
the initial returns in the auction were higher only when the last twelve rounds, 
out of the twenty-four in each session, are considered. Price dispersion was 
larger in the competitive IPO for all sessions and for the auction for the last 
twelve sessions. Book building also presented the maximum initial return in a 
single offering while the overall minimum occurred under the competitive IPO. 
The auction had the highest minimum initial return. 
Table 3 portrays mean difference statistics. There is no significant 
difference between the auction and book building. Initial returns are 
significantly larger with book building and the auction relative to the 
competitive IPO. The competitive IPO led to a much larger number of 
negative initial returns than the other two pricing methods. Investors perform 
much worse when the competitive IPO is employed. After some practice, it 
seems that investors fared better with the auction. The competitive IPO aimed 
to reduce pricing uncertainty but its greater standard deviation of initial 
returns and incidence of negative returns in our experiment does not suggest 
that it will reach this goal. 
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Table 2   Descriptive initial return statistics 
 
 
Panel A – Initial Returns – All Rounds 
 Auction Book building Competitive IPO All 
Mean 0.46% 1.33% -6.01% -1.41% 
Median 0.38% 0.92% -5.12% -1.53% 
Standard 
Deviation 8.22% 8.59% 10.45% 9.67% 
Maximum 19.04% 25.14% 17.32% 25.14% 
Minimum -13.38% -17.75% -44.99% -44.99% 
# Positive 37 41 16 94 
# Negative 35 31 56 122 
     
Panel B – Initial Returns – Last 12 Rounds 
Mean 1.62% -0.12% -4.67% -1.06% 
Median 1.89% 0.62% -5.02% -1.74% 
Standard 
Deviation 9.39% 7.95% 8.60% 8.99% 
Maximum 19.04% 15.66% 14.32% 19.04% 
Minimum -13.38% -17.75% -31.87% -31.87% 
# Positive 20 19 8 51 
# Negative 16 17 28 57 
 
 
Table 3   Mean initial return differences 
 
Panel A – All Rounds 
  t test                                 (t statistic) 
Wilcoxon test                                        
(v statistic) 
Auction vs. Book building -0.62 -0.48 
Book building vs. 
Competitive IPO  4.61** 4.05** 
Auction vs. Competitive 
IPO  4.13** 3.85** 
Panel B – Last 12 Rounds 
Auction vs. Book building 0.85 0.79 
Book building vs. 
Competitive IPO  2.33** 2.38** 
Auction vs. Competitive 
IPO  2.96** 2.47** 
Significance at 10% and 5% denoted by * and **, respectively. 
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Figure 2 shows the round by round evolution of initial returns per 
method. The greater concentration of positive initial returns with book building 
and of negative initial returns with the competitive IPO is clearly visible. There 
are more positive initial returns in the early rounds of book building while 
negative initial returns were more concentrated in the middle rounds of 
competitive IPO. There was no discernable pattern under the Dutch auction. 
Table 2 shows that the average of initial returns in book building in the last 
twelve rounds, when participants had sufficient time to develop their 
strategies, are lower than in the initial rounds, while they are greater in the last 
twelve rounds for the other two methods. The increase in returns as the rounds 
progress could indicate that the experience of participants leads to the 
development of winning strategies. However, the opposite trend in book 
building does not warrant this conclusion and may imply that we could see 














Figure 3 portrays private signals (Si) relative to bids. The maximum bid 
permitted was 150, thus the scale of the chart, because it might have been 
necessary to limit investors whose bids deviate significantly from their signals in 
the competitive IPO. This possibility was not controlled by Bonini and 
Voloshyna (2009) who did not impose restrictions on this behavior with the 
competitive IPO. The dispersion of bids is also greater under the competitive 
IPO. Perhaps its more complex rules led to a greater differentiation in the 
strategies followed by the subjects. 
 








Table 4 presents the differences between the bids and the private 
signal (Si) received by each investor in the book building and the competitive 
IPO sessions. The results indicate that the competitive IPO is more likely to 
result in bids greater than the price signaled in the private information. A 
visual inspection of Figure 3 supports this statement. Table 5 shows the bid 
premium relative to the midpoint of the preliminary price range. The largest 
adjustment took place with the Dutch auction, which was the only method 
showing a positive adjustment that was significantly larger than the other two 
methods in the last twelve rounds. The average price adjustment was 




Table 4   Information Revelation: Bid Premium over Private Price Signal 
 
 
Panel A – All Rounds 
 Book building 
Competitive 
IPO 
 Difference t 
test 
Mean -8.11% 4.53% -6.24** 
Median -2.36% 0.07%  
Standard 
Deviation 28.70% 46.21%  
Panel B – Last 12 Rounds 
Mean -6.75% 3.20% -4.14** 
Median -1.41% 0.05%  
Standard 
Deviation 30.25% 33.66%  
                     Significance at 10% and 5% denoted by * and **, respectively. 
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Table 5   Final Price Position 
 
Panel A – All Rounds 
 Auction Book building Competitive IPO 
Mean 2.26% -0.22% -34.21% 
Standard 
Deviation 11.00% 8.32% 17.68% 
Maximum 33.37% 17.72% -7.03% 
Minimum -25.42% -18.99% -84.00% 
    
 
 t test                                 
(t statistic) 
Wilcoxon test                                        
(v statistic)  
Auction vs. Book 
building 1.52 1.04  
Book building vs. 
Competitive IPO  14.76*** 7.37***  
Auction vs. 
Competitive IPO  14.86*** 7.34***  
    
Panel B – Last 12 Rounds 
 Auction Book building Competitive IPO 
Mean 3.91% -0.57% -35.39% 
Standard 
Deviation 9.23% 8.61% 18.16% 
Maximum 33.37% 17.72% -7.17% 
Minimum -11.20% -18.99% -84.00% 
    
 
 t test                                 
(t statistic) 
Wilcoxon test                                        
(v statistic)  
Auction vs. Book 
building 2.13** 1.70*  
Book building vs. 
Competitive IPO  10.39*** 5.22***  
Auction vs. 
Competitive IPO  11.58*** 5.22***  
Significance at 10% and 5% denoted by * and **, respectively. 
 
 
The subjects clearly employed the bait-and-switch strategy in the 
competitive IPO. The initial high bids served only to obtain the preliminary 
price range to increase their chances of being selected as the winning bank. 
However, subjects offered lower prices when asked to provide the actual bid, 
which were still higher than with other methods. Book building was the only 
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method in which returns went down after the subjects could learn about the 
process and had time to develop strategies. In the Dutch auction, on the 
other hand, returns increased, which could be related to the findings of Kagel 
and Levin (1986) regarding the incidence of the winner's curse in auctions. 
Even though these authors documented that agents learn and avoid 
incurring into the winner's curse by means of participation in subsequent 
auctions. 
5 – CONCLUSIONS 
 
In our comparisons of book building, the Dutch auction, and the 
competitive IPO we conclude that book building may be the IPO pricing 
method that most benefits bidding investors at the expense of the issuing firm 
and selling shareholders. The competitive IPO, in contrast, provided the best 
results for the issuing firm and selling shareholders, at the expense of investors. 
These results are in line with those of Bonini and Voloshyna (2009). It must be 
noted, nonetheless, that the competitive IPO showed greater dispersion in 
price formation, which somewhat goes against the motivation for its 
conception. We still found evidence of the use the bait-and-switch strategy in 
the competitive IPO suggesting that it is important to create rules that 
discourage this practice. Bait-and-switch may be better disguised with book 
building but competitive IPOs clearly expose it because the competition for 
mandates is ax explicit part of the offering procedure. Book building exhibited 
greater price formation stability, lower dispersion of initial returns and average 
deviation around the true offering price. This finding confirms the argument of 
Sherman and Titman (2002) that accuracy in the offer pricing leads to larger 
initial returns. 
Larger offer prices relative to the true value of the firm are better for the 
issuer and selling shareholders. Investors benefit from the opposite. Methods 
that lead to better price discovery are certainly in the interests of the issuer 
and selling shareholders and may contribute to noise reduction in this market. 
Reforms along those lines are not in the interest of underwriters, however 
(Green, 2007). Issuers could induce reforms taking into account the worldwide 
phenomena of underpricing in the short run. One can argue that the 
experiment does not lead to realistic conclusions, questioning the principle of 
parallelism, and thus the extensibility of the results. However, without actual 
data available for inspection or analysis to support the difference between 
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laboratory data and real world data, this kind of grumble is mere speculation 
(Smith, 1980, 1982). 
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